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Abstract
As more and more personal photos are shared online,
being able to obfuscate identities in such photos is becom-
ing a necessity for privacy protection. People have largely
resorted to blacking out or blurring head regions, but they
result in poor user experience while being surprisingly in-
effective against state of the art person recognizers [17]. In
this work, we propose a novel head inpainting obfuscation
technique. Generating a realistic head inpainting in social
media photos is challenging because subjects appear in di-
verse activities and head orientations. We thus split the task
into two sub-tasks: (1) facial landmark generation from im-
age context (e.g. body pose) for seamless hypothesis of sen-
sible head pose, and (2) facial landmark conditioned head
inpainting. We verify that our inpainting method generates
realistic person images, while achieving superior obfusca-
tion performance against automatic person recognizers.
1. Introduction
Social media have brought about large-scale sharing of
personal photos. While providing great user convenience,
such a dissemination can pose privacy threats on users. It
is essential to grant users an option to obfuscate themselves
out of these photos. A good obfuscation method for social
media photos should satisfy two criteria: naturalness and
effectiveness. For example, putting a large black box over a
person may be an effective obfuscation method, but would
not be pleasant enough to share with friends.
Previous work on visual content obfuscation can be
grouped into two categories: (1) target-specific and (2)
target-generic. Some papers have proposed target-specific
obfuscations, ones that are specialized against specific tar-
get machine systems, typically relying on adversarial exam-
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Figure 1: Our obfuscation method based on head inpainting
generates much more natural patterns than common tech-
niques like blurring, but still results in a more effective iden-
tity obfuscation against a recognizer.
ples [18, 23]. They yield nearly perfect identity protection
with imperceptible changes on the input, but such a perfor-
mance is guaranteed only against the targetted ones.
On the other hand, target-generic obfuscations change
the actual appearance of the person such that generic clas-
sifiers or even humans misjudge the identity. Commonly
used obfuscation methods like black eye bar, face blurring,
and blacking out head are examples of this type. These pat-
terns, unfortunately, are neither visually pleasant nor effec-
tive against machine systems [17]. This paper proposes a
head inpainting based approach to the target-generic iden-
tity obfuscation problem.
Generating realistic and seamless head inpainting on so-
cial media photos is hard. Subjects appear in diverse events
and activities, resulting in varied backgrounds and head
poses. Meanwhile, current generative face models are lim-
ited to frontal [3] or strictly aligned [12] faces.
We tackle the problem by factoring it into two stages.
First, depending on the access to original face pixels, we
either detect or generate facial landmarks. We detect them
when we have access to the original face image, but when
face has already been obfuscated, we generate (hypothe-
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size) them. The second scenario makes our approach ver-
satile, by letting us e.g. upgrade existing weak obfusca-
tions on the web including blacked out or blurred out heads
(called blackhead and blurhead in the remainder of the pa-
per) into our novel privacy-enhanced versions. Then, condi-
tioned on the face landmarks, we inpaint a realistic head that
blends naturally into the context. We show that the resulting
head-inpainted images mislead machine recognizers.
Our key contributions are: (1) Novel natural, effective
obfuscation methods based on head inpainting; (2) Novel
landmark guided image generation approach for both head
visible and blackhead cases in challenging social media
photos; (3) Novel facial landmark generator that effectively
hypothesize realistic facial structures and poses given con-
text (blackhead scenario).
2. Related work
Identity obfuscation. A few works from the vision com-
munity have analyzed and developed obfuscation patterns
for avoiding person identification. First, we introduce a line
of work on target-generic obfuscations that are designed
to work against generic automatic person recognizers as
well as humans. Oh et al. [17] and McPherson et al. [15]
have analyzed the obfuscation performance of blacking or
blurring faces against automatic recognizers. They have
concluded that these common obfuscation methods are not
only unpleasant but also ineffective, in particular due to the
adaptability of convnet-based recognizers [17]. More so-
phisticated approaches have been proposed since then. Has-
san et al. [8] have proposed to mask private image content
via cartooning. Brkic et al. [1] have generated full-person
patches to overlay on top of person masks. Similarly, we
propose an obfuscation technique based on head inpainting.
The key difference is that while [1] generates persons with
uniform poses independent of the context (fashion photos),
we naturally blend generated heads with diverse poses into
varied background and body poses (social media photos).
For the target-specific obfuscations, Oh et al. [18] and
Sharif et al. [23] have proposed adversarial example based
obfuscation. While the obfuscation performance is su-
perb even at imperceptible perturbation level, such a perfor-
mance depends highly upon the accessibility to target sys-
tem’s inner parameters. Since we aim to obfuscate identities
against a wide range of recognition systems, we do not con-
dition our inpainting against a specific recognizer.
Image inpainting. In our work, we propose generative ad-
versarial network (GAN) based method to complete head
regions based on the context. Raymond et al. [31] and
Pathak et al. [19] have also used GANs to inpaint pixels
based on the context. However, both approaches assume
appearance and texture similarity between the missing part
and the context. Our approach can inpaint heads solely from
body and scene context, without resorting to any informa-
tion from the head region. In particular, while [31] inpaints
aligned faces, we inpaint heads in the challenging social
media setup in which people appear with diverse poses and
backgrounds by taking a two-stage approach.
Structure guided image generation. For generating realis-
tic head inpainting that naturally blends into the given body
pose and scene context, we have conditioned the inpainting
on face landmarks. Prior work on structure-guided image
generation has shown that such a guidance is indeed very
helpful for generating images with complex inner structures
(e.g. persons) [13, 5, 28, 30, 6, 33, 14, 2]. Ma et al. [13]
have trained a system to synthesize persons based on pose.
Similarly, Walker et al. [28] have used the predicted fu-
ture poses to condition a GAN to generate future frames in
videos. In [30], Wang and Gupta factorizes the indoor scene
generation task into surface normal generation and texture
imbuing stages. Ehsani et al. [6] addresses the object occlu-
sion problem by first predicting the contour of the invisible
parts and then generating the appearance inside the contour.
Alpher et al. [5] have generated faces conditioning on de-
tected face landmarks. Despite the similarity shared by our
work, [5] only generates well-aligned faces. Our approach
generates realistic, seamless head patches in social media
photos where the body pose and the background are very
diverse.
3. Head inpainting framework
We focus on the scenario where the user wants to obfus-
cate some identities in a social media photo by inpainting
new heads for them. The task is challenging due to com-
plex poses and background typical in social media photos.
We use facial landmarks to provide strong guidance for the
head inpainter. We factor the head inpainting task into two
stages: (1) landmark detection or generation and (2) head
inpainting conditioned on body context and landmarks.
Figure 2 describes the global view of our two-stage ap-
proach. It takes either the original or blackhead image1 as
input, in order to give flexibility to deal with cases where the
original images are not available. Given original or head-
obfuscated input, stage-I detects or generates landmarks,
respectively. Stage-II takes the blackhead image and land-
marks as input, and outputs the generated image.
3.1. Stage-I: Landmark
In stage-I, we detect or generate face landmarks to guide
head inpainting in the subsequent stage. An overview of
stage-I is shown in Figure 3. For landmark detection, we de-
tect 68 facial keypoints using the python dlib toolbox [10].
For landmark generation, we train the Landmark Generator
(GL) adversarially with the Discriminator (DL). We will
1Blurhead image is another important obfuscation, and it is easily
adapted in our approach. We use blackhead image as a default example.
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Figure 2: Our two-stage head inpainting framework. The
input of stage-I is either the original or the blackhead image.
The output is the inpainted image.
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Figure 3: Stage-I: Landmark Detection/Generation. The
detector takes the original im e Ic as input; the genera-
tor takes a blackhead image I and the head mask M as
input. For the Decoder in GL, we consider three versions
of training: from scratch (Scratch); pre-training as autoen-
coder (AEDec); pre-training as Point Distribution Model
(PDMDec).
describe the landmark generat r in greater detail.
Landmark Generator (GL). GL has an autoencoder struc-
ture with two parts: Encoder and Decoder. The Encoder
compresses the body/sc ne context of the blackhead image
to a latent vector. The Decoder then decodes the vector into
landmark coordinates. I the following, we describe details
of the Encoder and Decoder.
Encoder ofGL. Encoder takes a blackhead image I and the
corresponding head maskM (indicating the head bounding
box) as inputs. Encoder maps the input X = [I;M ] to
a latent vector zL. Encoder has 6 convolutional residual
blocks; the latent vector zL is 32-dimensional.
Decoder of GL. Taking the latent vector zL as input, De-
coder generates 2 × 68 landmark coordinates L. Decoder
contains 6 fully connected residual blocks. Both Encoder
and Decoder are trained from scratch by default.
Training Encoder and Decoder from scratch is challeng-
ing due to diverse body pose and background clutter in so-
cial media photos. Therefore, we consider first training a
strong decoder and training the encoder from scratch with
respect to the trained (and fixed) decoder. Such a procedure
is inspired by the previous work on knowledge transfer be-
tween deep models trained on different tasks [7, 22].
We consider pre-training Decoder in three possible ways:
(1) from scratch (and simultaneously training with En-
coder), (2) autoencoder, and (3) using the Point Distribution
Model (PDM, [4]).
AE decoder (AEDec). The autoencoder reconstructs face
landmarks using an encoder and a decoder through a bot-
tleneck layer. Both are fully connected layers with ReLU
activations. L2 loss is as the loss function.
PDM decoder (PDMDec). We consider using the Point
Distrib tion Model (PDM) to better represent the 3D pose
variations [4, 32]2. We train the PDM over the detected
landmarks on PIPA train set images. Our landmark points
are parametrized using p = [s,R, t, q] denoting scale, ori-
entation, translation and non-rigid transformations, respec-
tively. The PDM decoder has the following formulation:
L = s ·R · (L¯3D +Φq) + t (1)
where L¯3D denotes the mean value of the 3D landmarks
mapped from our 2D data, and Φ the 3 × n principal com-
ponent matrix. The output L has n + 6 parameters. In the
experiments we us n = 34 principal components.
Loss functions of GL and DL. We use the L2 loss as well
as an adversarial loss for optimization. Landmarks trained
only with the L2 loss show noisy alignments; we found the
adversarial loss to be useful at remedying this. We adopt
the DCGAN discriminator [20]. The landmark coordinates
are converted to channels to input to the convolutional lay-
ers, where the conversion process is differentiable. We have
also tried a fully-connected discriminator, instead of the
DCGAN discriminator, but the difference was marginal.
For training DL, any landmark generated by GL are la-
beled fake, while we use the detected landmarks as the real
examples. Exact losses are formulated as follows:
LDL =EX∼pdata(X)
[
logDL(X)
]
+
EX∼pdata(X)
[
log (1−DL(GL(X)))
]
, (2)
LGL =EX∼pdata(X)
[
log (DL(GL(X)))
]
+
λL‖GL(X)−Ld‖2, (3)
where X is the concatenation of the obfuscated image I
(3 channels) and the head mask M (1 channel). Ld is the
detected landmark coordinates (ground truth). λL ≥ 0 is a
scalar weight.
2We use [32] to train the PDM model [4]. Non-rigid structure from
motion [27] is used to map 2D points to 3D in this code. Our training data
are the detected landmarks in PIPA TRAIN set.
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3.2. Stage-II: Inpainting
Stage-II generates the head inpainting based on the land-
marks from Stage-I and the blackhead or blurhead image.
Figure 4 shows an overview; the head generator GH is
trained adversarially with a head discriminator DH .
Ground truth
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Head mask
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Head Discriminator  DH (D of PG2)
Input
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Figure 4: Stage-II: Head generation. The input are black-
head image I and landmark channels Lh. The generator
has an Auto-encoder structure which encodes the input to a
bottleneck then decodes to a fake image. The discriminator
is the same as in DCGAN [20].
Input. The 68-channel landmark heatmaps Lh from Stage-
I are concatenated with the blackhead (or blurhead) image
I as an input to the generator GH . The landmark heatmaps
provide the missing skeleton information in the obfuscated
image.
We treat the blackhead image as fake and the original
image as real the head discriminator DH . Note that we use
the whole body image instead of just head regions to pro-
vide sufficient information about the body and background
to generate a realistic inpainting.
Head Generator (GH ) and Discriminator (DH ). The
head generator GH has a a convolutional autoencoder with
skip connections between encoder and decoder, inspired by
the U-Net [21]. The skip connections propagate image in-
formation directly from input to output, improving the fine-
grained details in the output. The architecture of the head
discriminator DH is the DCGAN discriminator [20].
Loss function. We use the L1 and the adversarial losses to
optimize GH and DH :
LDH =EY ∼pdata(Y )
[
logDH(Y )
]
+
EY ∼pdata(Y )
[
log (1−DH(GH(Y )))
]
, (4)
LGH =EY ∼pdata(Y )
[
log (DH(GH(Y )))
]
+
λH‖GH(Y )− Ic‖1, (5)
where Y is the concatenation of the obfuscated image I
and the landmark heatmaps Lh. Ic is the original image.
λH ≥ 0 is a scalar weight. Detailed architecture and hyper-
parameters are given in the supplementary materials.
4. Experiments
We evaluate the presented two-stage head inpainting
pipeline on a social media dataset in terms of inpainting ap-
pearance and pose plausibility, as well as the identity obfus-
cation performance against machine recognizers. We ana-
lyze the impact of different input types (original, blackhead,
and blurhead), different choices of landmark decoders, and
the losses for the landmark generators (§3.1).
4.1. Dataset
We use the PIPA dataset [34], the largest social media
dataset to date with people in diverse events, activities, and
poses. It is a suitable for evaluating our methods under the
social media obfuscation scenario.
In order to maximize the amount of training data, we
have introduced a new partitioning of the images in PIPA.
We partition 2,356 PIPA identities into TRAIN set (2,099
identities, 46,576 instances) and TEST set (257 identities,
5,175 instances). We have further pruned both partitions
with heavy profile or back-view heads, resulting in 34,383
instances in TRAIN and 1,909 in TEST. The TRAIN set is
used for training landmark and head generators. TEST set
is the evaluation set.
Our landmark a d inpainting generators take a fixed-size
image (256× 256× 3) as input. For every training and test-
ing sample, we prepare the input by first obtaining the body
crop, following the procedure in [16, 25]: extend the head
box with fixed ratios (3×width and 6×height), and then re-
size and zero-pad the body crop such that it fits tightly in
the square 256× 256.
4.2. Scenarios and inputs
Our approach introduced in §3 is versatile and supports
scenarios where the user (who wants to obfuscate an im-
age) has access to the original image or only has access to
already head-obfuscated images (e.g. blacked out). The
necessity for this versatility is that social network service
providers may aim to upgrade the privacy level by obfus-
cating images through blurring or blacking-out heads, even
though it has been shown to be quite ineffective [17].
In order to simulate multiple scenarios, we consider three
types of inputs to our obfuscator: original, blackhead, or
blurhead, where the latter two are common obfuscation
techniques these days. We prepare blackhead and blurhead
inputs following the procedure in [17]. PIPA head box an-
notations indicate the head region to be obfuscated, which
is either filled in with black pixels or smoothed with a Gaus-
sian blur kernel specified in [17].
4.3. Quantitative results
Our head inpainting should both look natural and effec-
tively obfuscate the identity. We report quantifiable mea-
surements of the two criteria in this section.
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Table 1: Evaluation of proposed obfuscation methods. We quantify the quality of the proposed obfuscation method against
landmark quality, inpainting quality, as well as obfuscation effectiveness (person recognition rates). We vary the loss (DL
here represents the adversarial loss) and decoder used in our landmark generator (§3.1); the head inpainter is always the GH
+ DH (§3.2).
Obfuscation method Evaluation
Landmark Landmark Inpainting Person recognizer
Input Loss Decoder L2 Norm. L2 SSIM mask-SSIM head body+head head contrib.
Original No head inpainting / / 1.000 1.000 85.6% 88.3% 72.2%
Original NN head copy-paste / / 0.872 0.195 1.2% 7.1% 67.5%
Blur No head inpainting / / 0.931 0.396 52.2% 71.6% 3.2%
Blur Detected landmarks 0.00 0.000 0.962 0.679 43.7% 51.7% 70.8%
Blur L2 Scratch 6.32 0.230 0.954 0.578 36.2% 48.4% 66.8%
Blur L2+DL Scratch 4.85 0.182 0.955 0.586 38.0% 48.4% 66.6%
Blur L2+DL AEDec 4.77 0.180 0.951 0.585 37.5% 48.0% 66.1%
Blur L2+DL PDMDec 4.50 0.168 0.953 0.593 37.9% 49.1% 66.7%
Black No head inpainting / / 0.815 0.000 2.1% 67.0% 14.0%
Black Detected landmarks 0.00 0.000 0.902 0.405 10.1% 21.4% 70.8%
Black NN landmarks 2.48 0.088 0.896 0.332 7.9% 20.4% 71.3%
Black L2 Scratch 13.6 0.501 0.884 0.186 5.8% 17.4% 73.6%
Black L2+DL Scratch 13.0 0.477 0.882 0.191 5.8% 17.2% 71.4%
Black L2+DL AEDec 11.7 0.431 0.885 0.199 5.6% 17.4% 72.5%
Black L2+DL PDMDec 12.3 0.453 0.885 0.196 5.6% 17.4% 71.0%
4.3.1 Landmark
As intermediate output, facial landmarks should represent a
realistic human face in order to provide correct guidance to
the inpainting stage. In this section, we evaluate the gen-
erated landmark quality in terms of the L2 distance to the
detected landmarks, assuming that the detected landmarks
are accurate. The L2 distances are normalized with respect
to the inter-ocular distances [10].
We investigate three axes of factors for our landmark
generator. (1) Input type: original, blackhead, or blurhead.
(2) Loss function: only L2 versus L2 and adversarial loss
(DL). (3) Decoder type: trained from scratch, autoencoder
pretrained (AEDec), or Point Distribution Model pretrained
(PDMDec). A summary of the results is in Table 1 (“Land-
mark” column). On the original images, our best landmark
generator achieves the L2 distance of 2.41 on average (not
shown in table), which gives an upper bound on the land-
marks generated on blurhead or blackhead.
Input type. We compare the L2 distance between the gen-
erated and detected landmarks for three types of inputs:
original, blackhead, or blurhead. For original images, we
use detected landmarks (by definition zero L2 distance).
We observe from Table 1 that blurhead inputs show more
accurate landmarks than blackhead cases: e.g. 6.32 (blur)
versus 13.6 (black) for the baseline landmark generator (L2
loss, trained from scratch). Blurhead images already pro-
vide much structural information.
Loss function. We compare two loss functions: without ad-
versarial loss (L2) versus with adversarial loss (L2 +DL).
Given a blackhead input with landmark decoder trained
from scratch, using only L2 loss yields the 13.6 distance,
while adding DL marginally improves the distance to 13.0.
However, for blurhead images, the improvement due to DL
is much greater (from 6.32 to 4.85).
Decoder. We consider three choices of decoder in the
landmark generator GL: learning from scratch (Scratch),
pre-trained with AE (AEDec), and pre-trained with PDM
(PDMDec). For both blurhead or blackhead cases, condi-
tioning the decoder with either AEDec or PDMDec helps
generating better landmarks: e.g. for blackhead input, L2
distance improved from 13.0 to 11.7 and 12.3, respectively.
4.3.2 Inpainting
Head inpainting, the final output of our method, should look
natural to be suitable as a social media photo. While we
will visualize the output and report user study in the next
sections (§4.4 and §4.5), we provide a large-scale summary
measures for the quality of final output using the SSIM dis-
tance [29] from the original image. We report two mea-
sures: comparing the whole images (SSIM [29]) and head
region only (mask-SSIM [13]). As a baseline, we consider
inpainting with the Nearest Neighbor (NN) head3. Our head
3NN head is searched in training data based on the mean L2 distance
of detected landmarks.
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inpainting always gives a better SSIM (>0.88) than this
baseline (0.872).
4.3.3 Obfuscation
We now measure how well our inpainting obfuscates corre-
sponding identities. Unlike some prior work [23, 18], our
obfuscation scheme is target generic – it is designed to ac-
tually change the identity, instead of fooling specific clas-
sifiers. We use state of the art person recognizers [16, 18]
to measure the change in identifability due to obfuscation.
While the method is target generic, we report results on two
recognisers with great structural differences to provide fur-
ther evidence that the obfuscation is effective regardless of
the target (experiments on one of the recognisers are in sup-
plementary materials). We provide a rationale for our good
obfuscation performance based on the analysis of the recog-
nizer attention. We show furthermore that the obfuscation
results in non-confident top-1 predictions – the obfuscation
does not change the appearance to another person known to
the recogniser (which may be unethical) but comes up with
a new, unseen identity.
Person recognizer. We use the social media person recog-
nition framework naeil [16]. Unlike typical face recog-
nizers, naeil uses body and scene context cues for recog-
nition. It has thus proved to be relatively immune to com-
mon obfuscation techniques like blacking or blurring head
regions [17].
Following [16], we first train feature extractors over head
and body regions, and then train an SVM identity classi-
fier on top of those features. We may also concatenate
features from multiple regions (e.g. head+body) to allow
it to extract cues from multiple regions. In our work, we
use GoogleNet [26] features from head and head+body
to evaluate obfuscation performances. AlexNet [11] based
recogniser is also considered in Supplementary Materials
to show that the obfuscation is similarly effective for two
greatly distinct types of recognisers (e.g. 98 layers for
GoogleNet and 8 layers for AlexNet).
Head inpainting provides good protection. Table
1 shows obfuscation performance (columns head and
head+body). Under no obfuscation, the head+body
recognition performance is 88.3%. Black/blurring baselines
give 67.0%, and 71.6%, respectively – confirming the ob-
servation in [17] that these are ineffective. On the other
hand, our head inpainting methods show < 50% (blurhead
input) and < 21% (blackhead input) recognition rates for
head+body recognizers. They are more effective protec-
tion techniques than blacking or blurring head regions.
Cues used. We compare the recognition rates between
head and head+body. When the recognizer relies solely
on head cues, while the head has been inpainted, then the
recognition rates are lower than the head+body counter-
parts. For example, the last row method against head rec-
ognizer gives 5.6% versus 17.4% for head+body, nearly
reaching the chance level recognition rate 2.1%.
Input type. While having access to blurred head images
help generating more plausible landmarks (§4.3.1) as well
as visually natural head inpainting (§4.4), they may leak
identity information. We compare the recognition rates
when either blurhead or blackhead inputs are used. Our
head inpainting based on blackhead result in 17% ∼ 21%
accuracy, while blurhead based results are in the range
48% ∼ 50% accuracy. The choice of input type gives users
a control over the trade-off between plausibility of gener-
ated heads and the obfuscation performance.
Detected versus generated landmarks. While identity in-
formation may leak through blurred heads, it may also leak
through the landmark detections (face shape). On the other
hand, generated landmarks enjoys the possibility to come
up with an equally plausible landmark hypothesis but with
different face shapes. For the blackhead input, the detected
landmarks indeed result in higher recognition rate (21.4%)
than generated ones (e.g. 17.4% on last row), with similar
trend for the blurhead cases.
Rationale for good obfuscation – recognizer attention.
We have verified that our head obfuscation scheme exhibits
better performance than commonly used ones like blacking
and blurring. We give a rationale for this phenomenon by
means of the recognizer attention. Given an input, recog-
nizer attention refers to the image regions where recogniz-
ers extract cues from. We hypothesize that while blacked
or blurred heads induce recognizer attention on non-head
regions, our inpainted heads attract attention on the heads.
For the recognizer attention we have used the gradient-
based mechanism from Simonyan et al. [24]. We first
compute the gradient of the neural network prediction
with respect to the input image; take maximal abso-
lute values along the RGB channel; and then smooth
with Gaussian blurring. To quantify the chance of at-
tending on the head region, we have computed the
“head contribution” score by estimating head contrib. =
P[max attention is inside head region] over the test samples.
See final column of table 1 for the results. We observe
that while the original image has 72.2% chance of inducing
attention on the head region, blacked or blurred heads are
much less likely to attract the recognizer’s attention (14.0%
and 3.2%, respectively). This explains why head+body is
still performing well: it simply ignores the confusing head
cue. On the other hand, our inpainting-based obfuscation
still attracts the recognizer’s attention as much as the non-
obfuscated head image does (71.0% versus 72.2%). This
indicates that the realism of inpainted heads encourages the
recognizer to still rely its decision on the inpainted head,
effectively leading to misjudgment by the recognizer.
Low prediction confidence and ethics. Ethical problems
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might entail if the obfuscation mislead the recogniser into
confidently predicting other identities in the gallery set.
We have measured the SVM prediction confidence (1-vs-
all SVM) on the original as well as obfuscated images to
ensure that the obfuscation results in a uniformly low pre-
diction scores.
On the original images, the top-1 identity is predicted
with SVM score 0.63 on average. On the other hand, our
inpainting conditioned on blurhead results in -0.29 average
top-1 SVM score, inpainting conditioned on blackhead re-
sults in much lower top-1 score of -0.52. This confirms that
the inpainting based obfuscation does not shift the identity
prediction to another person with high confidence. If the
recogniser filters out low-confidence predictions, a common
practice in application, then the head-inpainted images will
most likely be filtered out as “background identity”.
4.4. Qualitative results
For confirming the naturalness of the inpainted heads, we
have measured the SSIM score in §4.3.2. However, SSIM
is only a proxy measure. In this section, we qualitatively
visualize the quality of the generated landmarks as well as
inpainted heads. We also include user study in the next sec-
tion (§4.5)
For generating natural heads, landmarks should look like
that of an actual face and be consistent with the body pose.
However, at the same time obfuscation performance bene-
fits from landmarks that do not preserve the original face
shape. In this section, we discuss if our generated land-
marks achieve both realism, while effectively obfuscating
machine recognizers. Qualitative results are in Figure 5.
Detected versus generated landmarks. Given an origi-
nal image with a visible head, we detect landmarks, while
for blackhead we hypothesize them from regions other than
the head itself. The comparison between columns 2,3 (de-
tected landmarks) and columns 4,5 (generated landmarks)
in Figure 5 illustrates the difference. In all the examples
shown, the detected landmarks closely follow the original
image. On the other hand, the generated landmarks, espe-
cially for blackhead cases, results in landmarks and head in-
painting with different head poses. However, the generated
landmarks are still plausible with respect to the body pose
and activity. Finally, note that by generating landmarks, we
can further mask identity information (recognition rates are
consistently lower for inpainting based on generated land-
marks), while keeping reasonable realism.
Blackhead versus blurhead. Landmarks may be gener-
ated from either blurhead or blackhead images. We visu-
alize how the head information contained in blurred cases
improve the inpainting quality. Columns 2,4 and columns
3,5 in Figure 5 show respective examples for blur and black
cases. Involving blurred head images during landmark and
head generation results in inpainting that resembles the
original head, especially the head pose and hair color/style
(e.g. ID-690). On the other hand, not providing any infor-
mation in the head region results in a significantly different,
yet plausible, head images. In particular, when even land-
marks are generated, the resulting head images are drasti-
cally different from the original one. Such a shift of appear-
ance is reflected in the low recognition rate (17.4%).
Table 2: Human perceptual study (HPS) scores and land-
mark detection success ratios (LDSR). Landmarks are from
“detected”, and “generated” by PDMDec methods.
blurhead(Ours) blackhead(Ours)
Orig. CE [19] detected generated detected generated
HPS: 0.93 0.04 0.60 0.39 0.19 0.11
LDSR: 1.00 0.36 1.00 0.95 0.99 1.00
4.5. Comparing against the state-of-the-art
In this section, we compare the quality of our inpainting
against two state-of-the-art inpainting methods [19, 1] via
an extensive user study. We did not compare directly against
[1] because it focuses on full body replacement using body
contours and the generated heads are visually far from be-
ing competitive (e.g. Figure 1 in [1]). For all methods, we
perform the human perceptual study (HPS) on AmazonMe-
chanical Turk (AMT). For each method, we show 55 real
and 55 inpainted images in a random order to 20 users.
Users press the real or fake button for an image within a sec-
ond. The first 10 images are only practice samples [13, 9].
Table 2 shows comparison of the considered methods.
The first row contains the ratios of images that were judged
as real for different methods: (1) original unaltered; (2) in-
painted by the Context Encoder (CE) [19] (blackhead im-
age as input); (3) inpainted by our four models. We observe
several interesting results. (1) Only 93% of the participants
believed the original image to be real; this gives an upper
bound on the score. (2) Our method based on blackhead im-
ages with generated landmarks results in 11% of the users
believing that the image is real – nearly threefold boost from
the CE baseline (4%). (3) Conditioning on the blurhead
helps a lot (from 11% to 39% for generated landmarks) (4)
Detected landmarks greatly improve the realism compared
to generated ones (from 39% to 60% for blurhead). The re-
alism is not perfect yet, but we greatly outperform the prior
state of the art.
Finally, we also measure the landmark detection success
ratio (LDSR) as a proxy measure of the output soundness
(inspired by [9]). Intuitively, LDSR should be higher for
heads with greater realism. As shown in Table 2, heads in-
painted by our methods have LDSR above 95%, while ones
inpainted by CE achieve only 36%. Our methods generate
heads with much clearer face structures.
5056
690_72157624907956927_502414
9580.jpg
848_72157627869036624_623383
8021.jpg
EucliDistToGL = 2.25
EucliDistToGTL = 1.91
EucliDis = 3.45EucliDist = 3.24EucliDist = 3.52EucliDist = 
EucliDistToGL = 5.54
EucliDistToGTL = 1.90
EucliDist = 6.86EucliDist = 6.14EucliDist = 10.81EucliDist = 7.67
963_72157629623144215
_6998306231.jpg
EucliDistToGL = 5.58
EucliDistToGTL = 1.76
EucliDis = 6.91EucliDist = 5.77EucliDist = 7.16EucliDist = 
694_72157625003719
517_5079341707.jpg
691_72157624907956927_50241
47816.jpg
600_72157623631904443_44849441
36.jpg
707_72157625208730738_5100996619.jpg
EucliDistToGL = 10.56
EucliDistToGTL = 3.87
EucliDist = 13.77EucliDist = 14.33EucliDist = 17.84EucliDist = 
EucliDistToGL = 1.72
EucliDistToGTL = 2.76
EucliDist = 3.60EucliDist = 3.27EucliDist = 5.19EucliDist = 
EucliDistToGL = 16.05
EucliDistToGTL = 2.20
EucliDist = 7.40EucliDist = 6.58EucliDist = 9.16EucliDist = 
EucliDistToGL = 4.00
EucliDistToGTL = 2.68
EucliDist =5.95EucliDist = 3.09EucliDist = 9.16EucliDist = 
ID: 
690
ID: 
848
659_72157624635635
006_4852051202.jpg
Nearest Neighbor
663_72157624635635006_48
51548043.jpg
690_72157624907956927_502354
0857.jpg
707_72157625208730738_510099
6901.jpg
ID: 663
615_72157623924978078
_4549781344.jpg
ID: 
815
ID: 659
ID: 690
14.40
3.91
15.91 3.39
16.40 4.472.73
2.10
ID: 659
ID: 663
ID: 
815 ID: 690
7.07
3.39
ID: 707
ID: 707
659_72157624635635
006_4852051202.jpg
Detected  landmarks
(GT landmarks)
Ground truth
 images LG + LD
LG+LD
With AEDec
LG+LD
With PDMDec Nearest NeighborLG
14.27
663_72157624635635006_48
51548043.jpg
690_72157624907956927_502354
0857.jpg
707_72157625208730738_510099
6901.jpg
ID: 
663
615_72157623924978078
_4549781344.jpg
ID: 
815
ID: 
659
ID: 
690
8.47 10.98 14.40 3.91
15.41 18.28 25.52 15.91 3.39
21.01 21.95 20.73 16.40 4.47
3.61 5.95 2.62 2.73 2.10
ID: 
659
ID: 
663
ID: 
815
ID: 
690
7.92 5.27 5.93 7.07 3.39
ID: 
707
ID: 
707
2.07
1.90
5.53 2.56
2.41
Original
Detected  landmarks
Blurhead Blackhead
Generated landmarks using  (with PDMDec)
Blurhead Blackhead
NN landmarks
Blackhead
2.36
2.41
1.58
2.49
88.3% 51.7% 21.4% 49.1% 17.4% 20.4% Recognition:
1 0.962 0.902 0.953 0.885 0.897Inpaint SSIM:
-- 0 0 4.50 12.3 2.48Landmark L2: 
Landmark L2: 
Input image:
691_72157624907956927_50241
47816.jpg
ID: 691
1.39
ID: 691
3.98 1.90
Figure 5: Head inpainting results using detected and generated landmarks (from the PDMDec model). Top rows present key
quantitative numbers. The L2 distance between detected and generated landmarks is also given for each single instance.
5. Conclusion
To address the problem of obfuscating identities in so-
cial media photos, we have presented a two-stage head in-
painting method. Despite the challenges in the social me-
dia setup (diverse head and body poses and backgrounds),
our method has proved to generate both natural obfuscation
patterns that effectively confuses automatic person recog-
nizers. In particular, our method is target-generic: the ob-
fuscation is not conditioned on a particular recognizer, be
it human or machine. Also, the method does not require
access to the original image, enabling to “upgrade” weak
obfuscation patterns (e.g. blurred or blacked heads) to our
privacy-enhanced version.
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